DeadsetAce
Supporter
- May 31, 2004
- 107,233
- 53,420
2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by proshares,
- Start date
- Status
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
- Jan 25, 2008
- 25,730
- 2,900
- Mar 2, 2011
- 30,498
- 5,958
lightweight champion
Banned
- Jun 23, 2007
- 13,481
- 5,271
Good ol' Magic
Watched a Vine on Twitter last night of this for a good 5 minutes. Just ridiculously incredible play by him.
- Jul 18, 2012
- 20,396
- 14,184
I say this all the time, but Magic has the best group of business advisors on the planet.
Also...good on Ian Desmond.
The story behind Ian Desmond’s ‘END NF’ tattoo is incredible
Class act and a great dude.
Last edited:
- Mar 2, 2011
- 30,498
- 5,958
NICK SWISHER !!
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
- 1,844
Desmond and Gio are two of the coolest ballplayers I've met. Desmond singled out my brother and signed his jersey and a ball for him on his birthday last year
- Oct 13, 2000
- 22,885
- 2,317
Hard to describe how bad Jason Grilli is
- Mar 4, 2013
- 1,596
- 495
What is wrong with that Angels bullpen!???
Lmao
Lmao
jumpmanfromdabay
Banned
- Jan 25, 2008
- 25,730
- 2,900
-said every year
- Sep 4, 2006
- 48,666
- 28,944
- Jan 19, 2002
- 23,417
- 5,524
that tweet
- Jul 25, 2012
- 827
- 75
Gavin Floyd broken elbow another Braves pitcher is done we are cursed
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
- 1,844
Not really, ya'll and the Cardinals own the Nats souls
it's disgusting how they bend over and take it in the *** every time we play ya'll. We played better against the Braves in our 100+ loss seasons.
do work son
Banned
- May 22, 2010
- 17,118
- 5,186
he hit the ball...back into the pitching machine
- Jul 25, 2012
- 827
- 75
Not really, ya'll and the Cardinals own the Nats souls
I was watching tonights game and didnt realize Ryan Zimmerman playing left field since when did start playing lf? He's awful btw misplayed a flyball and his arm is dead awful throw home when Freeman was going to tag from 3rd
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
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Since he came off the DL. Can't play 3B anymore, and he's not that bad in LF although he did have a bad game last night. And his arm is shot, he belongs in the AL as a DH now or at 1B. He still isn't as bad as Adam Dunn or Mike Morse out there though...not to mention Paul Lo Duca and anyone else the Nats have ever tried throwing out in LF
they swear they can throw anyone out there to mask their shortcomings on defense.Probably someone ready to contribute either right away or next year. They really don't rebuild from the bottom up. I love Zobrist, I think he'll fit on any team in baseball
That was probably one of the top 3 games I've ever seen pitched. ******* Hanley
it's funny because we were just talking about how ****** a SS he is either that same day or the day before.
mr marcus
Banned
- May 3, 2010
- 26,572
- 5,415
kinda amazing how the nats are owned by the cards/braves
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
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Clayton Kershaw and Public Enemy No. 1.5.
So What Should a Jeff Samardzija Extension Cost?
Giancarlo Stanton’s Present and Future.
Think if you will, for a moment, about Jose Fernandez. What’s impressed you most about the healthy Jose Fernandez? Probably, it’s all the strikeouts, many of them coming on his breaking ball. This year, Clayton Kershaw has Jose Fernandez’s strikeout rate. Now veer off and think instead about Koji Uehara. The most amazing thing, probably, about Uehara is his impeccable command. This year, Kershaw has Koji Uehara’s walk rate. Finally, think about Tim Hudson. Hudson is among the league’s premier groundball specialists. He’s always been armed with a devastating hard sinker. This year, Kershaw has Tim Hudson’s groundball rate. This year’s Kershaw basically had the first three picks in the pitcher ability fantasy draft, and that explains how he’s allowed just 18 runs in ten starts, with seven of them coming in one.
None of them came in yesterday’s. Technically, Clayton Kershaw finished with a no-hitter, and not a perfect game. Realistically, he threw 1.037 perfect games, going above and beyond in the way that Armando Galarraga previously went above and beyond. And unlike with Galarraga, this wasn’t a start that came out of nowhere — with Kershaw, there was a sense of inevitability. You analyze his Wednesday start and you realize he didn’t do anything differently. He pitched like Clayton Kershaw, and this version of Clayton Kershaw was going to end up with at least one start of this kind. It was more a matter of when and where.
One is left with a variety of images. There’s Kershaw on the mound, standing straight up, arms to the sky. There’s Kershaw’s wife, watching along and feeling more anxiety than her husband. There’s everybody in the ballpark watching Kershaw’s curveball float and drop into the strike zone, hitter included. And there’s the slider, the wipeout slider responsible for the plurality of Wednesday’s outs. In all, Rockies hitters had the misfortune of batting 28 times. A dozen of those plate appearances ended with sliders, and of those, eight ended with strikeouts. All of the pitches were magical, but the slider stood out most, and given this opportunity, it’s worth a reflection on how Kershaw’s slider has progressed into arguably the greatest slider in the game.
Let’s watch a few examples. Here is an unfair pitch, thrown a number of times:
That’s just the best position player in the National League, no big deal.
That’s not the best position player in the National League.
That’s a fitting conclusion and a .gif of historical relevance.
The younger Kershaw was most known for his curveball. That much was justifiable, and as you might have noticed Wednesday, the curveball hasn’t gone anywhere. The curveball is outstanding, easily one of the game’s best. But over the years, Kershaw has folded in and developed more confidence in a slider. And the slider he was throwing in 2009 wasn’t the slider he was throwing Wednesday night. No, that pitch has evolved, and here’s an idea of how:
A breaking ball at 81 has gradually turned into a breaking ball at 87, to go with a fastball in the 90s and a curveball in the 70s. Between 2010 and 2011, Kershaw’s slider gained some power. The next year, it did it again. This year, he’s up another two ticks. Clayton Kershaw looked at what he did in 2013 and decided to try to be better than that. And, so far, he’s been true to his goal.
Laterally, the slider has always moved more or less like the curveball. Vertically, though, there used to be about eight inches of separation. Now there’s more than a foot, as the curve has stayed the same but the slider has tightened up. The slider, now, has less drop than ever, but it’s also faster than ever, which makes for a good trade-off. Understand that, over the years, the fastball has kept the same velocity. The curve has kept the same velocity. The slider has changed on its own, and this season to date, batters have missed it with more than half of their swings.
It’s not just the speed of the pitch that’s been changing. It’s also the location, which is evidence of Kershaw’s improving command. Courtesy of Brooks Baseball, let’s look at Kershaw’s rates of sliders thrown in the zone’s bottom third, or below:
For a while, just over half of Kershaw’s sliders could’ve been considered low. Now it’s more of a 4-to-1 ratio, the result being that batters have swung more, and batters have missed more. Previously, 28% of swings at Kershaw’s slider hit the ball fair. This year, that’s at 21%. The pitch is getting more strikes and more whiffs, and it’s allowed Kershaw to be absolutely dominant against lefties and righties alike. Let’s look at a few career contact rates against Kershaw’s slider:
High: 78% contact
Middle: 82%
Low: 44%
From Baseball Savant, here are Kershaw’s 2014 sliders that have been contacted:
And here are the 2014 sliders that have been missed:
Kershaw has always had a good fastball, that he’ll use in the middle of the zone or up. He’s always had that curve that works as a change of pace, coming in around 20 ticks slower. He’s had a slider for a while, but he’s never before had this slider, and he was already amazing with his last one. Now, the slider is sharper. Now, the slider is more consistently coming in on a different plane, staying down after approaching like a regular heater. Elevated sliders, before, could’ve been hit with fastball swings, and they could’ve been hit with air under them. Now they just drop to the bottom of the zone or below, yielding little opportunity to do damage even given contact, which has grown increasingly rare.
A year ago, Clayton Kershaw won the NL Cy Young Award. He’s since dropped his FIP by 79 points. The reasons are complex and numerous, but among them is the continued improvement of his slider, which he keeps in his back pocket along with Public Enemy No. 1. Clayton Kershaw isn’t amazing because he basically threw a perfect game against the Rockies. Clayton Kershaw is amazing because you could see a game like Wednesday’s coming a mile away. Those are the games you can throw when you possess two of the best pitches of their type on the planet.
None of them came in yesterday’s. Technically, Clayton Kershaw finished with a no-hitter, and not a perfect game. Realistically, he threw 1.037 perfect games, going above and beyond in the way that Armando Galarraga previously went above and beyond. And unlike with Galarraga, this wasn’t a start that came out of nowhere — with Kershaw, there was a sense of inevitability. You analyze his Wednesday start and you realize he didn’t do anything differently. He pitched like Clayton Kershaw, and this version of Clayton Kershaw was going to end up with at least one start of this kind. It was more a matter of when and where.
One is left with a variety of images. There’s Kershaw on the mound, standing straight up, arms to the sky. There’s Kershaw’s wife, watching along and feeling more anxiety than her husband. There’s everybody in the ballpark watching Kershaw’s curveball float and drop into the strike zone, hitter included. And there’s the slider, the wipeout slider responsible for the plurality of Wednesday’s outs. In all, Rockies hitters had the misfortune of batting 28 times. A dozen of those plate appearances ended with sliders, and of those, eight ended with strikeouts. All of the pitches were magical, but the slider stood out most, and given this opportunity, it’s worth a reflection on how Kershaw’s slider has progressed into arguably the greatest slider in the game.
Let’s watch a few examples. Here is an unfair pitch, thrown a number of times:
That’s just the best position player in the National League, no big deal.
That’s not the best position player in the National League.
That’s a fitting conclusion and a .gif of historical relevance.
The younger Kershaw was most known for his curveball. That much was justifiable, and as you might have noticed Wednesday, the curveball hasn’t gone anywhere. The curveball is outstanding, easily one of the game’s best. But over the years, Kershaw has folded in and developed more confidence in a slider. And the slider he was throwing in 2009 wasn’t the slider he was throwing Wednesday night. No, that pitch has evolved, and here’s an idea of how:
A breaking ball at 81 has gradually turned into a breaking ball at 87, to go with a fastball in the 90s and a curveball in the 70s. Between 2010 and 2011, Kershaw’s slider gained some power. The next year, it did it again. This year, he’s up another two ticks. Clayton Kershaw looked at what he did in 2013 and decided to try to be better than that. And, so far, he’s been true to his goal.
Laterally, the slider has always moved more or less like the curveball. Vertically, though, there used to be about eight inches of separation. Now there’s more than a foot, as the curve has stayed the same but the slider has tightened up. The slider, now, has less drop than ever, but it’s also faster than ever, which makes for a good trade-off. Understand that, over the years, the fastball has kept the same velocity. The curve has kept the same velocity. The slider has changed on its own, and this season to date, batters have missed it with more than half of their swings.
It’s not just the speed of the pitch that’s been changing. It’s also the location, which is evidence of Kershaw’s improving command. Courtesy of Brooks Baseball, let’s look at Kershaw’s rates of sliders thrown in the zone’s bottom third, or below:
For a while, just over half of Kershaw’s sliders could’ve been considered low. Now it’s more of a 4-to-1 ratio, the result being that batters have swung more, and batters have missed more. Previously, 28% of swings at Kershaw’s slider hit the ball fair. This year, that’s at 21%. The pitch is getting more strikes and more whiffs, and it’s allowed Kershaw to be absolutely dominant against lefties and righties alike. Let’s look at a few career contact rates against Kershaw’s slider:
High: 78% contact
Middle: 82%
Low: 44%
From Baseball Savant, here are Kershaw’s 2014 sliders that have been contacted:
And here are the 2014 sliders that have been missed:
Kershaw has always had a good fastball, that he’ll use in the middle of the zone or up. He’s always had that curve that works as a change of pace, coming in around 20 ticks slower. He’s had a slider for a while, but he’s never before had this slider, and he was already amazing with his last one. Now, the slider is sharper. Now, the slider is more consistently coming in on a different plane, staying down after approaching like a regular heater. Elevated sliders, before, could’ve been hit with fastball swings, and they could’ve been hit with air under them. Now they just drop to the bottom of the zone or below, yielding little opportunity to do damage even given contact, which has grown increasingly rare.
A year ago, Clayton Kershaw won the NL Cy Young Award. He’s since dropped his FIP by 79 points. The reasons are complex and numerous, but among them is the continued improvement of his slider, which he keeps in his back pocket along with Public Enemy No. 1. Clayton Kershaw isn’t amazing because he basically threw a perfect game against the Rockies. Clayton Kershaw is amazing because you could see a game like Wednesday’s coming a mile away. Those are the games you can throw when you possess two of the best pitches of their type on the planet.
So What Should a Jeff Samardzija Extension Cost?
Yesterday, the Cubs reportedly offered Jeff Samardzija a five year, $85 million extension, a deal that would allow him to remain in Chicago rather than get traded at some point in the next five weeks. Samardzija turned it down without even countering, and it’s now basically guaranteed that he’ll end the season in another uniform. Samardzija’s rejection of the Cubs offer does raise an interesting question for interested buyers, though; just how much is he going to cost in order to sign with a team that trades for him?
The Homer Bailey contract is reportedly the benchmark deal that Samardzija’s agents are working off of, which covered $105 million over six seasons. Because Bailey was already in line for a $10 million arbitration payday regardless, the extension was for five free agent years at a total cost of $95 million, but any new deal for Samardzija would buy out his final year of arbitration as well, making the total contract the more relevant figure for comparison. And it would make sense that his agents would use that deal, as it is a very recent deal for a pitcher with a very similar career. Behold.
Name IP BB% K% GB% HR/FB LOB% BABIP ERA- FIP- xFIP-
Jeff Samardzija 655.0 9% 22% 46% 11% 71% 0.298 99 94 97
Homer Bailey 937.2 8% 20% 45% 11% 71% 0.301 107 100 99
Hard to get more similar peripherals than that, though Bailey has pitched a few hundred more innings. If we limit ourselves to recent performance, here is what they’ve done over the last three calendar years.
Name IP BB% K% GB% HR/FB LOB% BABIP ERA- FIP- xFIP- WAR RA9-WAR
Jeff Samardzija 534.1 8% 24% 47% 11% 73% 0.300 92 88 89 8.6 7.3
Homer Bailey 603.2 6% 21% 45% 12% 73% 0.297 102 99 95 7.6 6.9
Again, very similar peripherals, with Samardzija being just a little bit better across the board. Don’t read too much into the somewhat sizable ERA gap, as Samardzija is Example A for why ERA is kind of stupid; he’s already allowed nine “unearned” runs this year, while Bailey hasn’t had any of his runs erased from the record. The earned/unearned distinction is basically useless, and creates the appearance of a separation here where one does not really exist.
Bailey really is a good comparison for Samardzija, and it’s difficult to argue that Samardzija should take less than what Bailey just got a few months ago. However, as we noted at the time, the Bailey deal looks like an overpay, and teams shouldn’t be signing up match that kind of price/performance ratio. While most other +2 to +3 WAR free agent pitchers were signing deals in the range of $50 million, Bailey got twice that, and without being a free agent.
The Bailey deal is an easy one to point to from the player’s perspective, but it’s something of an outlier when it comes to contracts for good-not-great starting pitchers. Samardzija is certainly a cut above the crop of free agents that hit the market last winter, but he’s not Cole Hamels or Zack Greinke, and his track record doesn’t even stack up against Matt Cain. Besides Bailey, the pitchers who have signed $100+ million contracts have been better pitchers than Jeff Samardzija.
And again, Samardzija isn’t going to be a free agent until after next season. If he doesn’t sign a long-term deal, he’s looking at something in the $9 or $10 million range for 2015 salary. While $85 million over five years might sound light, it’s $75 million for four free agent years, or nearly $19 million per season. To get to $100 million over the same term, Samardzija would be asking for the equivalent of $22.5 million for each of his free agent seasons.
There’s a lot of money in baseball these days, but is Jeff Samardzija really a $23 million per year pitcher? Keep in mind that he’s already 29, so such an extension would be buying out his age-31 to age-34 seasons. Samardzija projects as about a +3 WAR pitcher going forward; given normal aging, he’d be expected to be a roughly average pitcher by the time the extension actually kicks in. We’re definitely in a period of inflation in MLB salaries, but average pitchers aren’t going to cost $23 million per year in a couple of years.
Even if you think the current estimates of Samardzija’s talent levels are too conservative, you have to be really bullish on Samardzija to think that he’d be worth $90 million over his first four free agent seasons. Let’s assume that the cost of a win in the 2015 free agent market is $8 million apiece, because we think the league is just going to keep raking in money hand-over-fist. At a $90 million cost for four years, that would require Samardzija to produce roughly +11.25 WAR over those years just to be an average market-value deal.
If Samardzija didn’t decline at all between now and then, and entered that market as a +3 WAR pitcher, we’d expect something like a half WAR per season decline, which leads to a total +9 WAR over the following four seasons: +3.0, +2.5, +2.0, +1.5. To get to +11.25 WAR, you’d need him to not decline at all: +3.0, +2.9, +2.8, +2.6 gets you there. But keep in mind that Samardzija projects at about a +3 WAR pitcher in 2014, and we’re dealing with 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. To get that kind of value, you basically need Samardzija to be roughly as good of a pitcher in six years as he is today.
That’s the definition of a terrible bet. If Samardzija thinks his market value is $100 million over five years, then the best thing any team can do is probably let him prove it as a free agent in 18 months. Even the Cubs $85 million offer looks a little bit geneorus, given what Samardzija is, where he is in relation to free agency, and how pitchers age. I think the Cubs may end up pleased that he turned their deal down, as now they’re free to turn him into some good young talent, and they’ll still have that $85 million to go throw at other, almost-as-good free agents if they so choose.
If I’m a team looking to acquire Samardzija, the idea that he’s looking for a Bailey-type deal would cause me to view him as a year-and-a-half rental, not a trade-and-sign guy. The Bailey deal is a good comparison for Samardzija to use because it was a bad deal for the Reds. If he’s set on getting more than the most recent overpay, then there shouldn’t be a lot of teams banging down his door to sign him up long term.
The Homer Bailey contract is reportedly the benchmark deal that Samardzija’s agents are working off of, which covered $105 million over six seasons. Because Bailey was already in line for a $10 million arbitration payday regardless, the extension was for five free agent years at a total cost of $95 million, but any new deal for Samardzija would buy out his final year of arbitration as well, making the total contract the more relevant figure for comparison. And it would make sense that his agents would use that deal, as it is a very recent deal for a pitcher with a very similar career. Behold.
Name IP BB% K% GB% HR/FB LOB% BABIP ERA- FIP- xFIP-
Jeff Samardzija 655.0 9% 22% 46% 11% 71% 0.298 99 94 97
Homer Bailey 937.2 8% 20% 45% 11% 71% 0.301 107 100 99
Hard to get more similar peripherals than that, though Bailey has pitched a few hundred more innings. If we limit ourselves to recent performance, here is what they’ve done over the last three calendar years.
Name IP BB% K% GB% HR/FB LOB% BABIP ERA- FIP- xFIP- WAR RA9-WAR
Jeff Samardzija 534.1 8% 24% 47% 11% 73% 0.300 92 88 89 8.6 7.3
Homer Bailey 603.2 6% 21% 45% 12% 73% 0.297 102 99 95 7.6 6.9
Again, very similar peripherals, with Samardzija being just a little bit better across the board. Don’t read too much into the somewhat sizable ERA gap, as Samardzija is Example A for why ERA is kind of stupid; he’s already allowed nine “unearned” runs this year, while Bailey hasn’t had any of his runs erased from the record. The earned/unearned distinction is basically useless, and creates the appearance of a separation here where one does not really exist.
Bailey really is a good comparison for Samardzija, and it’s difficult to argue that Samardzija should take less than what Bailey just got a few months ago. However, as we noted at the time, the Bailey deal looks like an overpay, and teams shouldn’t be signing up match that kind of price/performance ratio. While most other +2 to +3 WAR free agent pitchers were signing deals in the range of $50 million, Bailey got twice that, and without being a free agent.
The Bailey deal is an easy one to point to from the player’s perspective, but it’s something of an outlier when it comes to contracts for good-not-great starting pitchers. Samardzija is certainly a cut above the crop of free agents that hit the market last winter, but he’s not Cole Hamels or Zack Greinke, and his track record doesn’t even stack up against Matt Cain. Besides Bailey, the pitchers who have signed $100+ million contracts have been better pitchers than Jeff Samardzija.
And again, Samardzija isn’t going to be a free agent until after next season. If he doesn’t sign a long-term deal, he’s looking at something in the $9 or $10 million range for 2015 salary. While $85 million over five years might sound light, it’s $75 million for four free agent years, or nearly $19 million per season. To get to $100 million over the same term, Samardzija would be asking for the equivalent of $22.5 million for each of his free agent seasons.
There’s a lot of money in baseball these days, but is Jeff Samardzija really a $23 million per year pitcher? Keep in mind that he’s already 29, so such an extension would be buying out his age-31 to age-34 seasons. Samardzija projects as about a +3 WAR pitcher going forward; given normal aging, he’d be expected to be a roughly average pitcher by the time the extension actually kicks in. We’re definitely in a period of inflation in MLB salaries, but average pitchers aren’t going to cost $23 million per year in a couple of years.
Even if you think the current estimates of Samardzija’s talent levels are too conservative, you have to be really bullish on Samardzija to think that he’d be worth $90 million over his first four free agent seasons. Let’s assume that the cost of a win in the 2015 free agent market is $8 million apiece, because we think the league is just going to keep raking in money hand-over-fist. At a $90 million cost for four years, that would require Samardzija to produce roughly +11.25 WAR over those years just to be an average market-value deal.
If Samardzija didn’t decline at all between now and then, and entered that market as a +3 WAR pitcher, we’d expect something like a half WAR per season decline, which leads to a total +9 WAR over the following four seasons: +3.0, +2.5, +2.0, +1.5. To get to +11.25 WAR, you’d need him to not decline at all: +3.0, +2.9, +2.8, +2.6 gets you there. But keep in mind that Samardzija projects at about a +3 WAR pitcher in 2014, and we’re dealing with 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. To get that kind of value, you basically need Samardzija to be roughly as good of a pitcher in six years as he is today.
That’s the definition of a terrible bet. If Samardzija thinks his market value is $100 million over five years, then the best thing any team can do is probably let him prove it as a free agent in 18 months. Even the Cubs $85 million offer looks a little bit geneorus, given what Samardzija is, where he is in relation to free agency, and how pitchers age. I think the Cubs may end up pleased that he turned their deal down, as now they’re free to turn him into some good young talent, and they’ll still have that $85 million to go throw at other, almost-as-good free agents if they so choose.
If I’m a team looking to acquire Samardzija, the idea that he’s looking for a Bailey-type deal would cause me to view him as a year-and-a-half rental, not a trade-and-sign guy. The Bailey deal is a good comparison for Samardzija to use because it was a bad deal for the Reds. If he’s set on getting more than the most recent overpay, then there shouldn’t be a lot of teams banging down his door to sign him up long term.
Giancarlo Stanton’s Present and Future.
For all of the natural ebbs and flows of individual player performance, the game’s ruling class — the elite of the elite — is a fairly closed society that remains fairly static from year to year. Any given season might have its Yasiel Puig, or its Albert Pujols conceding his seat. But the core membership is fairly predictable. What might happen in any given year, though, is one of these elite players taking a temporary step up in class ‚ reaching an even more rarified air than before. This week, let’s take a deeper look at the 2014 performance of some of the game’s elite and determine whether they have taken things to the next level. Today: Giancarlo Stanton.
Stanton has hit for big power since he arrived on the major-league scene in 2010 at age 20, after decimating the minor leagues to the tune of a .272-.365-.565 line, with 91 homers in 1,226 at bats. Some guys gradually grow into their power, but not Stanton. At the major-league level it’s been more of the same, with Stanton posting a career .270-.359-.542 line despite playing his home games in one of the more pitcher-friendly ballparks in the majors.
Based on my own park factors, which were calculated utilizing granular batted ball data, Marlins Park was the third most pitcher-friendly park in MLB last season, with an overall park factor of 90.2. It was the fifth most pitcher-friendly park with regard to fly balls (76.1) and eighth most with regard to line drives (96.2). It had a home run park factor of 68, dead last among MLB parks. Does this affect Mr. Stanton? Well, no, as most of his home runs would leave Yellowstone with room to spare.
Let’s attempt to put Stanton’s batted ball authority into some sort of perspective: In 2013, 0.52% of major league fly balls were hit at 105 mph or harder; 5.63% of Stanton’s were. Among line drives, 1.6% were hit at 105 or harder. An amazing 39.66% of Stanton’s were. Among grounders, 0.69% were hit at 105 mph or harder; 15.13% of Stanton’s were. That’s some pretty staggering stuff. Oh, and 2013 was Stanton’s worst season to date. This year, there have been 30 balls hit harder than 110 mph. Stanton hit 13 of them. Only two other players — Yasiel Puig and Mike Trout — have three of the top 30. Stanton has hit the three hardest homers in MLB this season, and four of the top five. When it comes to pure high-end, ball-striking thunder, Stanton stands alone.
There’s a whole lot more to being a successful major league hitter than pure explosiveness, though. The late Tony Gwynn may be the best evidence of that. Hitting a ton of line drives and never striking out gets it done, as well. Mark Trumbo is also convincing evidence. While he doesn’t hammer the ball quite as hard as Stanton, he does reside in the upper thunder tier. He’s been unable to crack the upper echelon of major league hitters because of several factors: his poor K and BB rates, and his exceedingly high ground-ball rate. Destroying the baseball gives Stanton a very significant margin for error in all of the other key offensive categories: strikeout, walk, popup, fly ball, line drive and ground-ball rates. Still, power alone does not guarantee his status as an elite offensive player.
On the surface, at the very least Stanton appears to be on track for the best season of his career. He’s pacing the NL in homers and RBI despite his home ballpark, and he’s flirting with the .300 mark for the first time in his career. Has Stanton truly taken a step forward and become an even greater threat at age 24 than at any other point during his relatively brief career? Or is he still the same pretty darned good Giancarlo Stanton he’s always been? Let’s take a closer look at his 2013 and 2014 plate appearance outcome frequency and production by BIP type data to see what, if any, changes have taken place. First, the frequency information:
FREQ – 2013
Stanton % REL PCT
K 27.8% 153 94
BB 14.7% 182 98
POP 11.4% 144 87
FLY 25.6% 89 26
LD 20.6% 95 38
GB 42.3% 102 58
FREQ – 2014
Stanton % REL PCT
K 25.1% 124 87
BB 13.4% 168 92
POP 10.7% 139 89
FLY 28.7% 103 57
LD 23.6% 113 84
GB 37.1% 85 13
First, and most obviously, Stanton resides near the top of both the K- and BB-rate scale. Though his 2014 K-rate percentile rank of 87 remain very high, it should be noted that he has shown small but steady progress in this department over his five MLB seasons, from 99 to 97 to 95 to 94 to 87. Baby steps. Though his BB percentile rank has declined from 98 in 2013 to 92 thus far in 2014, his trend remains positive: His BB rate percentile rank was 66 as recently as 2012. Stanton is getting an increasing share of “respect” walks; he’s already received 14 intentional ones in 2014, as many as in 2012 and 2013 combined. He gets plenty of unintentional intentional ones, as well.
Stanton also has consistently been a popup generator throughout his career. His 87 and 89 percentile ranks in this category in 2013 and 2014 are firmly in line with his career norms. A high K-high popup combination is an extremely risky one, which can only be overcome by extreme batted ball authority. Adam Dunn is a perfect example of such a player that went from superstar to one-dimensional power guy once the flower of his youth faded.
Stanton’s line-drive rate has jumped quite a bit, from a 38 percentile rank in 2013 to 84 so far this year. This would seem to ripe for regression as the season continues, as line-drive rates tend to fluctuate greatly for most hitters from year to year, and Stanton’s previous career high percentile rank of 45 suggests he isn’t likely to be one of the exceptions to the rule.
The biggest positive change in Stanton’s plate appearance outcome frequencies is his increased fly ball rate — from a 26 percentile rank in 2013 to 57 in 2014. For a hitter like Stanton who absolutely pulverizes the ball in the air, this is huge. Last year was a particularly poor one in this category for him, though, as his previous career-low fly ball percentile rank was 41 in his rookie 2010 season. In fact, all he has done this season is climb back near his previous career high percentile rank of 59, which was set in 2012. That, not coincidentally, was his best overall season prior to this year.
Let’s take a look at Stanton’s production by BIP type in 2013 and 2014, both before and after adjustment for context:
PROD – 2013
Stanton AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD
FLY 0.394 1.268 250 364
LD 0.845 1.397 205 163
GB 0.235 0.269 103 138
ALL BIP 0.370 0.715 163 185
ALL PA 0.248 0.359 0.479 135 149
PROD – 2014
Stanton AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD
FLY 0.412 1.314 273 322
LD 0.810 1.405 190 152
GB 0.318 0.348 176 140
ALL BIP 0.426 0.825 214 202
ALL PA 0.300 0.395 0.581 175 167
Stanton’s actual production on each BIP type is indicated in the AVG and SLG columns, and it’s converted to run values and compared to MLB average in the REL PRD column. That figure then is adjusted for context, such as home park, luck, etc., in the ADJ PRD column. For the purposes of this exercise, SH and SF are included as outs and HBP are excluded from the OBP calculation.
First of all, it must be emphasized that these are massive batted-ball authority numbers. Stanton batted a lusty .394 AVG-1.268 SLG on fly balls in 2013. After adjustment for context, he had an ADJ PRD figure of 364 on fly balls, which was second in the majors to Chris Davis, and just ahead of Miguel Cabrera and Pedro Alvarez. His REL PRD of 273 has been even better in 2014, though his contextual adjustment isn’t quite as large and gives him an ADJ PRD on fly balls of 322. Not a problem, however, as he is hitting a bunch more fly balls this season as compared to 2013.
Stanton’s actual production on line drives in both 2013 and 2014 has been incredible. Even after conservative adjustments for context, his ADJ PRD figures of 163 an 152 in those two years respectively, are off the charts. To add some perspective, Jose Bautista was the only other player to come close to Stanton in 2013, with a 146 ADJ PRD. Even Stanton’s ground ball authority is well above average, with 140 and 138 REL PRD figures in 2013 and 2014, despite a large number of soft, roll-over grounders in both seasons.
Overall, when all BIP are taken into consideration, Stanton’s REL PRD jumps from 185 in 2013 — which ranked fifth in the major behind Cabrera, Davis, Mike Napoli and Paul Goldschmidt — to 202 in 2014. This increase does not come from an increase in batted-ball authority, but actually from the improved batted-ball mix we covered earlier.
Stanton’s status as an extreme ground-ball puller is an area of concern to be monitored going forward. Thus far in 2014, he has 50 grounders to the left field-left-center field sectors, and only five to right field-right-center field. This makes him a rare right-handed-hitting shift candidate. The only other big-time righty power source who runs such an extreme split is Edwin Encarnacion. Today, with Stanton at the apex of his physical prowess, this is not a material issue, but it is an area of potential risk in the future.
So, has Giancarlo Stanton taken it to the next level? I’d say no, on balance. He has simply brought things back to where they were in 2012, except for a slight step forward in his K rate, and what is likely a temporary positive blip in his liner rate. Stanton is the elite thunder-maker, as he has been since he has arrived on the big-league stage. The K/BB combo remains an area of concern. The extreme pulling on the ground remains an area of concern. His ability to absolutely destroy the baseball when it is in his comfort zone enables him to shrug off these shortcomings and be one of the foremost offensive players in the game.
He will remain so, certainly through his twenties, but there will come a time when he goes from the most forceful impactor of the baseball to one of the best. He will need to develop a more well-rounded, nuanced offensive portfolio by then to remain there. Miguel Cabrera doesn’t pop up, he doesn’t roll over an inordinate number of grounders to the pull side and he strikes out at a much lower rate than Stanton.
Stanton doesn’t need to be Cabrera, but he needs to make some degree of progress in those categories to avoid Adam Dunn-like risk as he enters his early thirties and potentially pursues a second massive payday.
Stanton has hit for big power since he arrived on the major-league scene in 2010 at age 20, after decimating the minor leagues to the tune of a .272-.365-.565 line, with 91 homers in 1,226 at bats. Some guys gradually grow into their power, but not Stanton. At the major-league level it’s been more of the same, with Stanton posting a career .270-.359-.542 line despite playing his home games in one of the more pitcher-friendly ballparks in the majors.
Based on my own park factors, which were calculated utilizing granular batted ball data, Marlins Park was the third most pitcher-friendly park in MLB last season, with an overall park factor of 90.2. It was the fifth most pitcher-friendly park with regard to fly balls (76.1) and eighth most with regard to line drives (96.2). It had a home run park factor of 68, dead last among MLB parks. Does this affect Mr. Stanton? Well, no, as most of his home runs would leave Yellowstone with room to spare.
Let’s attempt to put Stanton’s batted ball authority into some sort of perspective: In 2013, 0.52% of major league fly balls were hit at 105 mph or harder; 5.63% of Stanton’s were. Among line drives, 1.6% were hit at 105 or harder. An amazing 39.66% of Stanton’s were. Among grounders, 0.69% were hit at 105 mph or harder; 15.13% of Stanton’s were. That’s some pretty staggering stuff. Oh, and 2013 was Stanton’s worst season to date. This year, there have been 30 balls hit harder than 110 mph. Stanton hit 13 of them. Only two other players — Yasiel Puig and Mike Trout — have three of the top 30. Stanton has hit the three hardest homers in MLB this season, and four of the top five. When it comes to pure high-end, ball-striking thunder, Stanton stands alone.
There’s a whole lot more to being a successful major league hitter than pure explosiveness, though. The late Tony Gwynn may be the best evidence of that. Hitting a ton of line drives and never striking out gets it done, as well. Mark Trumbo is also convincing evidence. While he doesn’t hammer the ball quite as hard as Stanton, he does reside in the upper thunder tier. He’s been unable to crack the upper echelon of major league hitters because of several factors: his poor K and BB rates, and his exceedingly high ground-ball rate. Destroying the baseball gives Stanton a very significant margin for error in all of the other key offensive categories: strikeout, walk, popup, fly ball, line drive and ground-ball rates. Still, power alone does not guarantee his status as an elite offensive player.
On the surface, at the very least Stanton appears to be on track for the best season of his career. He’s pacing the NL in homers and RBI despite his home ballpark, and he’s flirting with the .300 mark for the first time in his career. Has Stanton truly taken a step forward and become an even greater threat at age 24 than at any other point during his relatively brief career? Or is he still the same pretty darned good Giancarlo Stanton he’s always been? Let’s take a closer look at his 2013 and 2014 plate appearance outcome frequency and production by BIP type data to see what, if any, changes have taken place. First, the frequency information:
FREQ – 2013
Stanton % REL PCT
K 27.8% 153 94
BB 14.7% 182 98
POP 11.4% 144 87
FLY 25.6% 89 26
LD 20.6% 95 38
GB 42.3% 102 58
FREQ – 2014
Stanton % REL PCT
K 25.1% 124 87
BB 13.4% 168 92
POP 10.7% 139 89
FLY 28.7% 103 57
LD 23.6% 113 84
GB 37.1% 85 13
First, and most obviously, Stanton resides near the top of both the K- and BB-rate scale. Though his 2014 K-rate percentile rank of 87 remain very high, it should be noted that he has shown small but steady progress in this department over his five MLB seasons, from 99 to 97 to 95 to 94 to 87. Baby steps. Though his BB percentile rank has declined from 98 in 2013 to 92 thus far in 2014, his trend remains positive: His BB rate percentile rank was 66 as recently as 2012. Stanton is getting an increasing share of “respect” walks; he’s already received 14 intentional ones in 2014, as many as in 2012 and 2013 combined. He gets plenty of unintentional intentional ones, as well.
Stanton also has consistently been a popup generator throughout his career. His 87 and 89 percentile ranks in this category in 2013 and 2014 are firmly in line with his career norms. A high K-high popup combination is an extremely risky one, which can only be overcome by extreme batted ball authority. Adam Dunn is a perfect example of such a player that went from superstar to one-dimensional power guy once the flower of his youth faded.
Stanton’s line-drive rate has jumped quite a bit, from a 38 percentile rank in 2013 to 84 so far this year. This would seem to ripe for regression as the season continues, as line-drive rates tend to fluctuate greatly for most hitters from year to year, and Stanton’s previous career high percentile rank of 45 suggests he isn’t likely to be one of the exceptions to the rule.
The biggest positive change in Stanton’s plate appearance outcome frequencies is his increased fly ball rate — from a 26 percentile rank in 2013 to 57 in 2014. For a hitter like Stanton who absolutely pulverizes the ball in the air, this is huge. Last year was a particularly poor one in this category for him, though, as his previous career-low fly ball percentile rank was 41 in his rookie 2010 season. In fact, all he has done this season is climb back near his previous career high percentile rank of 59, which was set in 2012. That, not coincidentally, was his best overall season prior to this year.
Let’s take a look at Stanton’s production by BIP type in 2013 and 2014, both before and after adjustment for context:
PROD – 2013
Stanton AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD
FLY 0.394 1.268 250 364
LD 0.845 1.397 205 163
GB 0.235 0.269 103 138
ALL BIP 0.370 0.715 163 185
ALL PA 0.248 0.359 0.479 135 149
PROD – 2014
Stanton AVG OBP SLG REL PRD ADJ PRD
FLY 0.412 1.314 273 322
LD 0.810 1.405 190 152
GB 0.318 0.348 176 140
ALL BIP 0.426 0.825 214 202
ALL PA 0.300 0.395 0.581 175 167
Stanton’s actual production on each BIP type is indicated in the AVG and SLG columns, and it’s converted to run values and compared to MLB average in the REL PRD column. That figure then is adjusted for context, such as home park, luck, etc., in the ADJ PRD column. For the purposes of this exercise, SH and SF are included as outs and HBP are excluded from the OBP calculation.
First of all, it must be emphasized that these are massive batted-ball authority numbers. Stanton batted a lusty .394 AVG-1.268 SLG on fly balls in 2013. After adjustment for context, he had an ADJ PRD figure of 364 on fly balls, which was second in the majors to Chris Davis, and just ahead of Miguel Cabrera and Pedro Alvarez. His REL PRD of 273 has been even better in 2014, though his contextual adjustment isn’t quite as large and gives him an ADJ PRD on fly balls of 322. Not a problem, however, as he is hitting a bunch more fly balls this season as compared to 2013.
Stanton’s actual production on line drives in both 2013 and 2014 has been incredible. Even after conservative adjustments for context, his ADJ PRD figures of 163 an 152 in those two years respectively, are off the charts. To add some perspective, Jose Bautista was the only other player to come close to Stanton in 2013, with a 146 ADJ PRD. Even Stanton’s ground ball authority is well above average, with 140 and 138 REL PRD figures in 2013 and 2014, despite a large number of soft, roll-over grounders in both seasons.
Overall, when all BIP are taken into consideration, Stanton’s REL PRD jumps from 185 in 2013 — which ranked fifth in the major behind Cabrera, Davis, Mike Napoli and Paul Goldschmidt — to 202 in 2014. This increase does not come from an increase in batted-ball authority, but actually from the improved batted-ball mix we covered earlier.
Stanton’s status as an extreme ground-ball puller is an area of concern to be monitored going forward. Thus far in 2014, he has 50 grounders to the left field-left-center field sectors, and only five to right field-right-center field. This makes him a rare right-handed-hitting shift candidate. The only other big-time righty power source who runs such an extreme split is Edwin Encarnacion. Today, with Stanton at the apex of his physical prowess, this is not a material issue, but it is an area of potential risk in the future.
So, has Giancarlo Stanton taken it to the next level? I’d say no, on balance. He has simply brought things back to where they were in 2012, except for a slight step forward in his K rate, and what is likely a temporary positive blip in his liner rate. Stanton is the elite thunder-maker, as he has been since he has arrived on the big-league stage. The K/BB combo remains an area of concern. The extreme pulling on the ground remains an area of concern. His ability to absolutely destroy the baseball when it is in his comfort zone enables him to shrug off these shortcomings and be one of the foremost offensive players in the game.
He will remain so, certainly through his twenties, but there will come a time when he goes from the most forceful impactor of the baseball to one of the best. He will need to develop a more well-rounded, nuanced offensive portfolio by then to remain there. Miguel Cabrera doesn’t pop up, he doesn’t roll over an inordinate number of grounders to the pull side and he strikes out at a much lower rate than Stanton.
Stanton doesn’t need to be Cabrera, but he needs to make some degree of progress in those categories to avoid Adam Dunn-like risk as he enters his early thirties and potentially pursues a second massive payday.
- Sep 27, 2007
- 20,619
- 1,615
Baseball America's Ben Badler reports that Cuban outfielder Yasmani Tomas has defected from his native country in order to pursue a contract with a major league team.
Tomas, 23, has played five seasons in Serie Nacional, so he will be exempt from the international bonus pools. Badler says the outfielder "was arguably one of the top 10 or so players left in Cuba in terms of major league potential" and that Tomas "has 70 raw power on the 20-80 scale."
The 23-year-old will have to obtain residency in another country, get an unblocking license from the OFAC and be declared a free agent by Major League Baseball before being allowed to sign a contract. Badler thinks it's unlikely Tomas will sign with an MLB club before the end of the season, but he figures to be one of the bigger free agent fish over the winter.
Tomas, 23, has played five seasons in Serie Nacional, so he will be exempt from the international bonus pools. Badler says the outfielder "was arguably one of the top 10 or so players left in Cuba in terms of major league potential" and that Tomas "has 70 raw power on the 20-80 scale."
The 23-year-old will have to obtain residency in another country, get an unblocking license from the OFAC and be declared a free agent by Major League Baseball before being allowed to sign a contract. Badler thinks it's unlikely Tomas will sign with an MLB club before the end of the season, but he figures to be one of the bigger free agent fish over the winter.
- Sep 27, 2007
- 20,619
- 1,615
man i think he is the goods.
The only thing I hope for is he doesn't go the route of Chris Davis his first few seasons in the MLB. Everyone said he had this TITANIC swing and power and for years all he did was strike out. And eventually he put it together but it took a while
- Status
