- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
- 1,844
I'd love for the Nats to acquire Kemp. Just no where to put him in the OF, unless we trade Span and move Harper back to CF.
2016 MLB thread. THE CUBS HAVE BROKEN THE CURSE! Chicago Cubs are your 2016 World Series champions
- Thread in 'Sports & Training' Thread starter Started by proshares,
- Start date
- Status
- Feb 17, 2007
- 21,784
- 2,957
In the last two years -- since June 2, 2012 -- the A's are the best-in-baseball, with a record of 203-126 (.617), which is 11 1/2 games better than Atlanta (193-135, .58, 13 games ahead of Detroit (188-137, .57
It has been an amazing two year run, so I wanted to dive into the stats over that span a bit. As we know, starting the day on June 2, 2012, the A's were 22-30--good for last place in the AL West and the second worst record in the AL. The A's had been outscored by 40 runs, also second worst in the AL. From that point on, the A's closed the season going 72-38 and outscoring their opponents by 139 runs--both tops in MLB. They haven't looked back since.
Over the past two calendar years, the A's were not only been 11.5 games ahead of the next best team, they've also dominated in run differential. Here are the top 5 run differentials in MLB over the past 2 years:
Rk Team RD Pyth% Pyth/162
1. Oakland +394 .625 101-61
2. Cardinals +252 .584 95-67
3. Tigers +251 .581 94-68
4. Braves +233 .587 95-67
5. Reds +162 .558 90-72
First, offense. The A's have scored 1612 runs over the past two years, which is the most in baseball. They have led the majors in walks (1202) and Isolated Slugging (.172) and are second in home runs (405, two behind Baltimore).
Donaldson has hit .294/.376/.505 for a 147 wRC+ (8th in MLB, 5th in AL) with 13.4 WAR (4th in MLB, 3rd in AL, despite being in AAA for two months).
Moss has hit .270/.349/.554 for a 149 wRC+ (7th in MLB, 4th in the AL). He has 64 HR (8th in MLB) and a .283 ISO (3rd in MLB).
Coco has hit .268/.343/.449 for a 121 wRC+ (6th among CF in MLB) and 7.3 WAR (7th among CF in MLB).
Cespedes has hit .262/.319/.479 for a 119 wRC+ (4th among LF in MLB) and 6.6 WAR (6th among LF in MLB). He has 54 HR (17th in MLB) and a .217 ISO (18th in MLB)
Second, the pitching. The A's have allowed 1218 runs over the past two years, which is the third fewest in MLB and the fewest in the AL (Rays are second at 1272). They have allowed the second fewest walks, second fewest hits, and third fewest HRs in the AL.
The SP have had a 3.56 ERA (6th in MLB, 2nd in the AL), and their relievers have a 3.07 ERA (3rd in MLB, 2nd in AL). They've had 11 players make at least 9 starts, led by Milone with 57 starts.
Astros Officially Create the Sign-and-Promote with Jon Singleton.
Getting Ready for the 2014 Amateur Draft.
Tigers' Austin Jackson getting into his comfort zone at plate.
Prospect Watch: Revisiting Rule 5 Recommendations.
Jose Bautista and the 9-3 Putout.
For the last year or so, the Astros have reportedly been offering various long-term deals to some of the young players in their organization, using the carrot of guaranteed millions to try and buy out a couple of free agent years. Up until now, no one had signed the offer, and Evan Longoria remained the record holder for fewest number of days of service before signing a long-term deal. However, with first base prospect Jon Singleton, the Astros have now codified the first deal that officially includes a Major League call-up as part of the package.
According to Jeff Passan of Yahoo Sports, Singleton’s deal is for $10 million guaranteed over the next five seasons, beginning in 2014, with three team options that could push the total value of the deal to $35 million. By getting seven more years of team control after this season, the Astros are essentially buying one free agent year in advance — they would have owned the rest of 2014 anyway, plus six full seasons afterwards — and signing this deal now allowed Singleton to get promoted without worrying about the Super-Two deadline. Had Singleton not signed the deal, he likely would have spent several more weeks in Triple-A.
It goes without saying that this deal is a huge potential boon to the Astros. If Singleton turns out to be a quality player, he would have gone well beyond $35 million in his arbitration years and first free agent season, but if Singleton busts, they’re only out $7 or $8 million above and beyond what they would have paid by going year to year. Risking $7 or $8 million for a chance to save upwards of $30 million — let’s assume a high-quality slugging 1B would have earned ~$40 million in future arbitration earnings and another ~$25 million for his first free agent year — is a total no-brainer for a team like the Astros. There’s a reason they’ve been trying to get nearly every player with any modicum of talent to take deals like these. These deals lean very heavily towards the organization’s favor.
But for Singleton, this represents a significant guarantee. As an 8th round pick in the 2009 draft, he signed for $200,000, so he hasn’t been living in poverty as a minor leaguer, but between taxes, agent commissions, living expenses, and his admitted drug addiction, it’s safe to say that he probably doesn’t have a lot of that money left. In fact, when discussing this particular deal, we cannot ignore Singleton’s past words.
“At this point, it’s pretty evident to me that I’m a drug addict,” Singleton told The Associated Press over breakfast on a recent day near the Astros’ camp. “I don’t openly tell everyone that, but it’s pretty apparent to myself.”
First baseman Jon Singleton spent a month at a rehab facility last year to battle marijuana addiction. “He’s still young and still learning about baseball and about life,” Astros GM Jeff Luhnow said.
Vividly so.
“I know that I enjoy smoking weed, I enjoy being high, and I can’t block that out of my mind that I enjoy that,” he said. “So I have to work against that.”
On the one hand, one could argue that giving a self-admitted drug addict $10 million in guaranteed money makes this deal even more of a risk for the Astros. After all, his resources available to purchase marijuana just went way up.
But I think there’s a flip side to this coin as well. The Astros have now provided Singleton with a significant, contractually-guaranteed financial motivation to stay clean. There’s now a tangible financial cost to failing a drug test, and he can measure exactly how much those drugs would cost him if he failed a test and got suspended. Where the cost was previously abstract, pushing back his timeline to reach arbitration at some point in three or four years, it is now laid out in black and white exactly how much money Singleton will lose if he gets caught using drugs again.
As outsiders, I think this is a case where we know even less than usual about the amount of risk a player should be willing to carry in exchange for future potential gain. While players should not be lining up to take these kinds of deals, I find it hard to tell an admitted drug-addict that he should bet on himself staying clean and living up to his potential. Maybe for Singleton, having his future potential earnings spelled out in a long-term contract will be just the motivation he needs to stay clean.
In this particular case, I find it hard to suggest that Singleton sold his risk too cheaply, because we just can’t really know what his own personal risk tolerance is, or should be. Given his past, perhaps taking $10 million now really will be better for him than going year to year would have been.
The opposite could be true as well, of course. I think, in a situation like this, we lack the requisite information to suggest that there was clearly a better path for the player. In this case, if asked whether this deal was a good idea for Singleton, it feels like “I don’t know” is the only response I’m comfortable with.
According to Jeff Passan of Yahoo Sports, Singleton’s deal is for $10 million guaranteed over the next five seasons, beginning in 2014, with three team options that could push the total value of the deal to $35 million. By getting seven more years of team control after this season, the Astros are essentially buying one free agent year in advance — they would have owned the rest of 2014 anyway, plus six full seasons afterwards — and signing this deal now allowed Singleton to get promoted without worrying about the Super-Two deadline. Had Singleton not signed the deal, he likely would have spent several more weeks in Triple-A.
It goes without saying that this deal is a huge potential boon to the Astros. If Singleton turns out to be a quality player, he would have gone well beyond $35 million in his arbitration years and first free agent season, but if Singleton busts, they’re only out $7 or $8 million above and beyond what they would have paid by going year to year. Risking $7 or $8 million for a chance to save upwards of $30 million — let’s assume a high-quality slugging 1B would have earned ~$40 million in future arbitration earnings and another ~$25 million for his first free agent year — is a total no-brainer for a team like the Astros. There’s a reason they’ve been trying to get nearly every player with any modicum of talent to take deals like these. These deals lean very heavily towards the organization’s favor.
But for Singleton, this represents a significant guarantee. As an 8th round pick in the 2009 draft, he signed for $200,000, so he hasn’t been living in poverty as a minor leaguer, but between taxes, agent commissions, living expenses, and his admitted drug addiction, it’s safe to say that he probably doesn’t have a lot of that money left. In fact, when discussing this particular deal, we cannot ignore Singleton’s past words.
“At this point, it’s pretty evident to me that I’m a drug addict,” Singleton told The Associated Press over breakfast on a recent day near the Astros’ camp. “I don’t openly tell everyone that, but it’s pretty apparent to myself.”
First baseman Jon Singleton spent a month at a rehab facility last year to battle marijuana addiction. “He’s still young and still learning about baseball and about life,” Astros GM Jeff Luhnow said.
Vividly so.
“I know that I enjoy smoking weed, I enjoy being high, and I can’t block that out of my mind that I enjoy that,” he said. “So I have to work against that.”
On the one hand, one could argue that giving a self-admitted drug addict $10 million in guaranteed money makes this deal even more of a risk for the Astros. After all, his resources available to purchase marijuana just went way up.
But I think there’s a flip side to this coin as well. The Astros have now provided Singleton with a significant, contractually-guaranteed financial motivation to stay clean. There’s now a tangible financial cost to failing a drug test, and he can measure exactly how much those drugs would cost him if he failed a test and got suspended. Where the cost was previously abstract, pushing back his timeline to reach arbitration at some point in three or four years, it is now laid out in black and white exactly how much money Singleton will lose if he gets caught using drugs again.
As outsiders, I think this is a case where we know even less than usual about the amount of risk a player should be willing to carry in exchange for future potential gain. While players should not be lining up to take these kinds of deals, I find it hard to tell an admitted drug-addict that he should bet on himself staying clean and living up to his potential. Maybe for Singleton, having his future potential earnings spelled out in a long-term contract will be just the motivation he needs to stay clean.
In this particular case, I find it hard to suggest that Singleton sold his risk too cheaply, because we just can’t really know what his own personal risk tolerance is, or should be. Given his past, perhaps taking $10 million now really will be better for him than going year to year would have been.
The opposite could be true as well, of course. I think, in a situation like this, we lack the requisite information to suggest that there was clearly a better path for the player. In this case, if asked whether this deal was a good idea for Singleton, it feels like “I don’t know” is the only response I’m comfortable with.
Getting Ready for the 2014 Amateur Draft.
Major League Baseball will hold it’s Rule 4 amateur draft on this week, with the main action on Thursday, June 5. MLB Network and MLB.com will broadcast and stream, respectively, pick-by-pick coverage of the first four rounds: Round One, Competitive Balance Round A, Round Two, and Competitive Balance Round B. In essence, the top 74 spots. The draft will continue untelevised on Friday and Saturday.
This is the second year for the new draft rules that were implemented as part of the collective bargaining agreement inked at the end of 2011. Before last’s year’s draft, I wrote a two-parter on the new rules. Part I (here) discussed the changes to the free-agent compensation system and the competitive balance draft picks. Note that the qualifying offer price after the 2013 season was $14.1 million. Part 2 (here) explained the new draft slot values (the amount a team can spend on each particular draft pick, with the most money going to the number one pick) and the new draft bonus pools (the total amount each team can spend in the Rule 4 draft). If you’re unfamiliar with the new rules, or just need a refresher, take a look at last year’s posts before reading on.
2014 Draft Order
The following is the list of draft picks through the end of the third round (draft pick number 104).
First Round Competitive Balance Round A Second Round Competitive Balance Round B Third Round
1. Astros 35. Rockies 42. Astros 69. D’Backs 75. Astros
2. Marlins 36. Marlins 43. Marlins 70. D’Backs 76. Marlins
3. White Sox 37. Astros 44. White Sox 71. Cardinals 77. White Sox
4. Cubs 38. Indians 45. Cubs 72. Rays 78. Cubs
5. Twins 39. Pirates 46. Twins 73. Pirates 79. Twins
6. Mariners 40. Royals 47. Phillies 74. Mariners 80. Mariners
7. Phillies 41. Brewers 48. Rockies 81. Phillies
8. Rockies 49. Blue Jays 82. Rockies
9. Blue Jays 50. Brewers 83. Blue Jays
10. Mets 51. Padres 84. Mets
11. Blue Jays 52. Giants 85. Brewers
12. Brewers 53. Angels 86. Padres
13. Padres 54. D’Backs 87. Giants
14. Giants 55. Yankees 88. Angels
15. Angels 56. Royals 89. D’Backs
16. D’Backs 57. Nationals 90. Orioles
17. Royals 58. Reds 91. Yankees
18. Nat’ls 59. Rangers 92. Royals
19. Reds 60. Rays 93. Nationals
20. Rays 61. Indians 94. Reds
21. Indians 62. Dodgers 95. Rangers
22. Dodgers 63. Tigers 96. Rays
23. Tigers 64. Pirates 97. Indians
24. Pirates 65. Athletics 98. Dodgers
25. Athletics 66. Braves 99. Tigers
26. Red Sox 67. Red Sox 100. Pirates
27. Cards 68. Cardinals 101. Athletics
28. Royals 102. Braves
29. Reds 103. Red Sox
30. Rangers 104. Cards
31. Indians
32. Braves
33. Red Sox
34. Cards
The Yankees lost their first round pick when they signed Brian McCann away from the Braves, and their Competitive Balance Round A picks for signing Jacoby Ellsbury (Red Sox) and Carlos Beltran (Cardinals). The Mets forfeited their second round pick when they signed Curtis Granderson away from the Yankees (the Mets’ first round pick was protected). The Mariners lost a second round pick when they signed Robinson Cano away from the Yankees (Seattle’s first round pick was also protected). The Rangers, Orioles, and Braves also lost first round picks for signing Shin-Soo Choo (Reds), Nelson Cruz (Rangers), and Ervin Santana (Royals), respectively. The Orioles also lost a second round pick for signing Ubaldo Jimenez away from the Indians.
Draft Slot Value and Bonus Pools
The total allotment for the first ten rounds of the draft is $205,786,400, just a 1.6% increase over the 2013 total ($202,501,600). That’s in contrast to the 8.2% increase between the 2012 slot value totals and the 2013 slot value totals. Baseball America predicts teams will spend more than the amount allotted for the first ten rounds, as they did last year, the first under the full set of new rules.
The Marlins would have led all teams with $14,199,300 in their bonus pool, but they just traded their 39th pick with a $1,457,600 slot value to the Pirates for reliever Bryan Morris. The Marlins now have $12,741,700 to spend on draft picks. The Astros are first with $13,362,200 to spend. The Orioles have the least amount to spend — only $2,204,400. You can see the full list of team bonus pools here, from Baseball America.
The Astros have the first pick in the draft for the third year in a row. The slot value for the number one pick is set at $7,922,100. Note, however, that the Astros didn’t spend the full amount allotted for the number one draft pick in either 2012 or 2013. The Cardinals have the last pick in the first round, with a slot value of only $1,650,400. Baseball America lists the draft slot values for the first 315 picks here.
Tune in this week on MLB Network or MLB.com. And then watch as teams work to sign their drafted players by the July 18 deadline.
This is the second year for the new draft rules that were implemented as part of the collective bargaining agreement inked at the end of 2011. Before last’s year’s draft, I wrote a two-parter on the new rules. Part I (here) discussed the changes to the free-agent compensation system and the competitive balance draft picks. Note that the qualifying offer price after the 2013 season was $14.1 million. Part 2 (here) explained the new draft slot values (the amount a team can spend on each particular draft pick, with the most money going to the number one pick) and the new draft bonus pools (the total amount each team can spend in the Rule 4 draft). If you’re unfamiliar with the new rules, or just need a refresher, take a look at last year’s posts before reading on.
2014 Draft Order
The following is the list of draft picks through the end of the third round (draft pick number 104).
First Round Competitive Balance Round A Second Round Competitive Balance Round B Third Round
1. Astros 35. Rockies 42. Astros 69. D’Backs 75. Astros
2. Marlins 36. Marlins 43. Marlins 70. D’Backs 76. Marlins
3. White Sox 37. Astros 44. White Sox 71. Cardinals 77. White Sox
4. Cubs 38. Indians 45. Cubs 72. Rays 78. Cubs
5. Twins 39. Pirates 46. Twins 73. Pirates 79. Twins
6. Mariners 40. Royals 47. Phillies 74. Mariners 80. Mariners
7. Phillies 41. Brewers 48. Rockies 81. Phillies
8. Rockies 49. Blue Jays 82. Rockies
9. Blue Jays 50. Brewers 83. Blue Jays
10. Mets 51. Padres 84. Mets
11. Blue Jays 52. Giants 85. Brewers
12. Brewers 53. Angels 86. Padres
13. Padres 54. D’Backs 87. Giants
14. Giants 55. Yankees 88. Angels
15. Angels 56. Royals 89. D’Backs
16. D’Backs 57. Nationals 90. Orioles
17. Royals 58. Reds 91. Yankees
18. Nat’ls 59. Rangers 92. Royals
19. Reds 60. Rays 93. Nationals
20. Rays 61. Indians 94. Reds
21. Indians 62. Dodgers 95. Rangers
22. Dodgers 63. Tigers 96. Rays
23. Tigers 64. Pirates 97. Indians
24. Pirates 65. Athletics 98. Dodgers
25. Athletics 66. Braves 99. Tigers
26. Red Sox 67. Red Sox 100. Pirates
27. Cards 68. Cardinals 101. Athletics
28. Royals 102. Braves
29. Reds 103. Red Sox
30. Rangers 104. Cards
31. Indians
32. Braves
33. Red Sox
34. Cards
The Yankees lost their first round pick when they signed Brian McCann away from the Braves, and their Competitive Balance Round A picks for signing Jacoby Ellsbury (Red Sox) and Carlos Beltran (Cardinals). The Mets forfeited their second round pick when they signed Curtis Granderson away from the Yankees (the Mets’ first round pick was protected). The Mariners lost a second round pick when they signed Robinson Cano away from the Yankees (Seattle’s first round pick was also protected). The Rangers, Orioles, and Braves also lost first round picks for signing Shin-Soo Choo (Reds), Nelson Cruz (Rangers), and Ervin Santana (Royals), respectively. The Orioles also lost a second round pick for signing Ubaldo Jimenez away from the Indians.
Draft Slot Value and Bonus Pools
The total allotment for the first ten rounds of the draft is $205,786,400, just a 1.6% increase over the 2013 total ($202,501,600). That’s in contrast to the 8.2% increase between the 2012 slot value totals and the 2013 slot value totals. Baseball America predicts teams will spend more than the amount allotted for the first ten rounds, as they did last year, the first under the full set of new rules.
The Marlins would have led all teams with $14,199,300 in their bonus pool, but they just traded their 39th pick with a $1,457,600 slot value to the Pirates for reliever Bryan Morris. The Marlins now have $12,741,700 to spend on draft picks. The Astros are first with $13,362,200 to spend. The Orioles have the least amount to spend — only $2,204,400. You can see the full list of team bonus pools here, from Baseball America.
The Astros have the first pick in the draft for the third year in a row. The slot value for the number one pick is set at $7,922,100. Note, however, that the Astros didn’t spend the full amount allotted for the number one draft pick in either 2012 or 2013. The Cardinals have the last pick in the first round, with a slot value of only $1,650,400. Baseball America lists the draft slot values for the first 315 picks here.
Tune in this week on MLB Network or MLB.com. And then watch as teams work to sign their drafted players by the July 18 deadline.
Tigers' Austin Jackson getting into his comfort zone at plate.
"Sometimes, you can just do everything right and the results aren't coming," Tigers outfielder Austin Jackson said before a late-May game against the Athletics. And if you look at what Jackson is doing at the plate, he's right.
Big changes in parts of his process all seem positive, but the results aren't quite there yet. Could good times be around the corner?
The most stark change Jackson is demonstrating comes when we look at the numbers that evaluate his swing decisions. At FanGraphs, we track how often a player reaches at pitches outside the zone (O-Swing%) and inside the zone (Z-Swing%). Jackson has incrementally improved this skill with every year in the bigs, but this year he has taken a large step forward. His contact rate has enjoyed it:
Season O-Swing% Z-Swing% Contact%
2010 28.6% 65.8% 79.4%
2011 27.5% 62.4% 77.4%
2012 24.0% 61.5% 80.6%
2013 26.5% 62.9% 80.8%
2014 19.4% 65.1% 83.3%
When asked about it, Jackson said most of it had to do with "figuring out more about yourself as a hitter and your strike zone, and each year getting a little more experience at the plate."
We know that hitters generally take more pitches with age, but there's something more to it. Jackson feels like he's finally getting to know what pitchers are trying to do to him, and he's seeing it quicker. Using FanGraphs' new heat maps, we can see this in action. Right-handed pitchers are throwing Jackson low and away as much as they can this year:
So Jackson is swinging at those pitches less often this year. Take particular note of the bottom quadrants off the outside corner. First comes 2013, and then below is 2014.
Perhaps that's what he meant when he said: "It's a little tougher at this level because they have more information about what kind of hitter you are, your weaknesses, so you constantly have to keep making adjustments."
Now he knows "what kind of hitter" he is (he likes it in) and how they are trying to pitch him (out over the plate), and he's made the adjustment (not swinging at stuff off the outside corner).
The other major change in Jackson's game has to do with fly balls. He's hitting significantly more fly balls than he ever has before:
Season GB/FB HR/FB
2010 1.77 3.30%
2011 1.31 6.90%
2012 1.24 11.40%
2013 1.36 9.20%
2014 0.76 4.50%
This isn't the result of moving down in the order -- to Jackson, "the objective is still to get on base," even if he's not at the top of the order any more.
But maybe this new loft is the result of a change he's made to this swing. Austin Jackson once dropped a pronounced leg kick after he struggled his rookie season. Now it's back. The swing in 2010:
Without the kick in 2013:
The kick is back in 2014:
He's not sure of the link between his leg kick and added fly balls. He said it might help him use his legs a little bit more by "having leverage, getting up to come down." But largely, the new kick is about comfort.
"I didn't really think, 'I want to do a leg kick.' I just wanted to do something this offseason that felt natural and didn't feel like a forced movement," Jackson said about going back to his old swing.
Comfort and timing. And timing is the reason he didn't do this before.
"When your timing is screwed up a bit, any extra movement can be detrimental, really, because you have to do a lot before you hit," Jackson said. "It's kind of hard to hit the pitch if your foot is in the air."
But Jackson is more mature these days, and so comfort trumped any timing issues the kick might bring to the table.
One last thing Jackson has going for him this year is his health. He's attempting more steals (one every seven games, up from a career low of one every 11 games last year), and his defensive numbers are up (1.3 defensive range runs this year, up from a career low of -4.4 last year), and it's mostly because of a healthy leg.
"That's such an aggressive movement, a burst, I was a little more cautious taking off on the basepaths last year because I hurt my hamstring," Jackson said.
Now he can finally "let it rip and not feel any soreness," and his game appreciates it.
With his health in place, his approach at the plate locked in and his swing producing the fly balls that could boost his power, Austin Jackson has set the table for great results. And as the player said: "If you can concentrate on the process and making sure that you're doing everything that you can mechanically, eventually the results are going to come around."
Big changes in parts of his process all seem positive, but the results aren't quite there yet. Could good times be around the corner?
The most stark change Jackson is demonstrating comes when we look at the numbers that evaluate his swing decisions. At FanGraphs, we track how often a player reaches at pitches outside the zone (O-Swing%) and inside the zone (Z-Swing%). Jackson has incrementally improved this skill with every year in the bigs, but this year he has taken a large step forward. His contact rate has enjoyed it:
Season O-Swing% Z-Swing% Contact%
2010 28.6% 65.8% 79.4%
2011 27.5% 62.4% 77.4%
2012 24.0% 61.5% 80.6%
2013 26.5% 62.9% 80.8%
2014 19.4% 65.1% 83.3%
When asked about it, Jackson said most of it had to do with "figuring out more about yourself as a hitter and your strike zone, and each year getting a little more experience at the plate."
We know that hitters generally take more pitches with age, but there's something more to it. Jackson feels like he's finally getting to know what pitchers are trying to do to him, and he's seeing it quicker. Using FanGraphs' new heat maps, we can see this in action. Right-handed pitchers are throwing Jackson low and away as much as they can this year:
So Jackson is swinging at those pitches less often this year. Take particular note of the bottom quadrants off the outside corner. First comes 2013, and then below is 2014.
Perhaps that's what he meant when he said: "It's a little tougher at this level because they have more information about what kind of hitter you are, your weaknesses, so you constantly have to keep making adjustments."
Now he knows "what kind of hitter" he is (he likes it in) and how they are trying to pitch him (out over the plate), and he's made the adjustment (not swinging at stuff off the outside corner).
The other major change in Jackson's game has to do with fly balls. He's hitting significantly more fly balls than he ever has before:
Season GB/FB HR/FB
2010 1.77 3.30%
2011 1.31 6.90%
2012 1.24 11.40%
2013 1.36 9.20%
2014 0.76 4.50%
This isn't the result of moving down in the order -- to Jackson, "the objective is still to get on base," even if he's not at the top of the order any more.
But maybe this new loft is the result of a change he's made to this swing. Austin Jackson once dropped a pronounced leg kick after he struggled his rookie season. Now it's back. The swing in 2010:
Without the kick in 2013:
The kick is back in 2014:
He's not sure of the link between his leg kick and added fly balls. He said it might help him use his legs a little bit more by "having leverage, getting up to come down." But largely, the new kick is about comfort.
"I didn't really think, 'I want to do a leg kick.' I just wanted to do something this offseason that felt natural and didn't feel like a forced movement," Jackson said about going back to his old swing.
Comfort and timing. And timing is the reason he didn't do this before.
"When your timing is screwed up a bit, any extra movement can be detrimental, really, because you have to do a lot before you hit," Jackson said. "It's kind of hard to hit the pitch if your foot is in the air."
But Jackson is more mature these days, and so comfort trumped any timing issues the kick might bring to the table.
One last thing Jackson has going for him this year is his health. He's attempting more steals (one every seven games, up from a career low of one every 11 games last year), and his defensive numbers are up (1.3 defensive range runs this year, up from a career low of -4.4 last year), and it's mostly because of a healthy leg.
"That's such an aggressive movement, a burst, I was a little more cautious taking off on the basepaths last year because I hurt my hamstring," Jackson said.
Now he can finally "let it rip and not feel any soreness," and his game appreciates it.
With his health in place, his approach at the plate locked in and his swing producing the fly balls that could boost his power, Austin Jackson has set the table for great results. And as the player said: "If you can concentrate on the process and making sure that you're doing everything that you can mechanically, eventually the results are going to come around."
Prospect Watch: Revisiting Rule 5 Recommendations.
Back in late November 2013, I published a Rule 5 draft preview with some names of players that had intrigued me over the course of the previous season but had been left unprotected by their current organization. None of the players were subsequently selected and all remained with their original organization. Let’s have a look at a few of my favorites to see how they’re performing in 2014…
Ryan Tepera, RHP, Toronto Blue Jays (Profile)
Level: Triple-A Age: 26 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 26.1 IP, 22 H, 8 R, 34/13 K/BB, 2.39 ERA, 2.71 FIP
Tepera ranked as my No. 1 Rule 5 eligible player prior to last December’s draft. The right-hander spent the majority of his minor league career as an indistinguishable org arm before moving from the starting rotation to the bullpen last year.
The result of that move was a significant bump to his fastball velocity (into the mid 90s) and a sharper breaking pitching. When I saw the right-hander pitch in early April, he was struggling to command the ball in the cold weather and his control took a huge hit with 10 walks in 13.0 April innings. In May, he issued just three free passes in 12.1 innings while seeing his strikes for the month jump from 12 to 22.
Currently leading the American League East division in the standings, Toronto could be active on the trade market over the summer months and I continue to suggest that Tepera is a player worth acquiring; with three option years remaining he can offer a big league club a lot of flexibility to go along with a near-MLB-ready arm with the ceiling of a set-up man.
Giovanny Urshela, 3B, Cleveland Indians (Profile)
Level: Double/Triple-A Age: 22 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: .269/.318/.493, 8 HR, 13/38 BB/K, 1 SB
Known for having a steady glove at the hot corner, Urshela has generated more pop so far in 2014, first while repeating Double-A and then once he received a promotion to Triple-A. After producing just 23 doubles and eight home runs last year, he’s already compiled 15 two-base knocks and eight homers in less than half the games this season.
A free swinger — albeit one that makes above-average contact — this Colombia native needs to become more selective to fully tap into his full potential at the plate. Urshela likely doesn’t have first-division starter potential but I could see him developing into a solid bench player capable of handling both third and first base while playing solid defence at both positions.
Marco Hernandez, SS, Chicago Cubs (Profile)
Level: High-A Age: 21 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: .273/.310/.353, 1 HR, 8/29 BB/K, 2 SB
When I first laid eyes on Hernandez a couple of years ago, I knew nothing about him but he stood out more to me than some of the other “bigger named prospects” on the Cubs’ minor league club that I was watching. He’s not an overly physical player but he’s a good athlete and has solid actions at shortstop — even if he continues to make youthful mistakes and may eventually see more time at second base.
He’s a left-handed hitter and he’s struggled mightily against southpaws in 2014 (Splits: .205/.222/.250 vs LHP; .296/.339/.389 vs RHP) suggesting he could develop into a solid bench or platoon player if shielded from tough port-siders. Some added upper-body strength could help his overall game and create better gap pop but he’ll never be a power-hitter.
Ryan Tepera, RHP, Toronto Blue Jays (Profile)
Level: Triple-A Age: 26 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: 26.1 IP, 22 H, 8 R, 34/13 K/BB, 2.39 ERA, 2.71 FIP
Tepera ranked as my No. 1 Rule 5 eligible player prior to last December’s draft. The right-hander spent the majority of his minor league career as an indistinguishable org arm before moving from the starting rotation to the bullpen last year.
The result of that move was a significant bump to his fastball velocity (into the mid 90s) and a sharper breaking pitching. When I saw the right-hander pitch in early April, he was struggling to command the ball in the cold weather and his control took a huge hit with 10 walks in 13.0 April innings. In May, he issued just three free passes in 12.1 innings while seeing his strikes for the month jump from 12 to 22.
Currently leading the American League East division in the standings, Toronto could be active on the trade market over the summer months and I continue to suggest that Tepera is a player worth acquiring; with three option years remaining he can offer a big league club a lot of flexibility to go along with a near-MLB-ready arm with the ceiling of a set-up man.
Giovanny Urshela, 3B, Cleveland Indians (Profile)
Level: Double/Triple-A Age: 22 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: .269/.318/.493, 8 HR, 13/38 BB/K, 1 SB
Known for having a steady glove at the hot corner, Urshela has generated more pop so far in 2014, first while repeating Double-A and then once he received a promotion to Triple-A. After producing just 23 doubles and eight home runs last year, he’s already compiled 15 two-base knocks and eight homers in less than half the games this season.
A free swinger — albeit one that makes above-average contact — this Colombia native needs to become more selective to fully tap into his full potential at the plate. Urshela likely doesn’t have first-division starter potential but I could see him developing into a solid bench player capable of handling both third and first base while playing solid defence at both positions.
Marco Hernandez, SS, Chicago Cubs (Profile)
Level: High-A Age: 21 Top-15: N/A Top-100: N/A
Line: .273/.310/.353, 1 HR, 8/29 BB/K, 2 SB
When I first laid eyes on Hernandez a couple of years ago, I knew nothing about him but he stood out more to me than some of the other “bigger named prospects” on the Cubs’ minor league club that I was watching. He’s not an overly physical player but he’s a good athlete and has solid actions at shortstop — even if he continues to make youthful mistakes and may eventually see more time at second base.
He’s a left-handed hitter and he’s struggled mightily against southpaws in 2014 (Splits: .205/.222/.250 vs LHP; .296/.339/.389 vs RHP) suggesting he could develop into a solid bench or platoon player if shielded from tough port-siders. Some added upper-body strength could help his overall game and create better gap pop but he’ll never be a power-hitter.
Jose Bautista and the 9-3 Putout.
To begin:
Wow. That’s a pretty boring GIF, huh? J.A. Happ threw that pitch and Omar Infante fouled it off. Nothing to see here.
Unless, that is, you already know what happened in this at bat. The Omar Infante in this GIF doesn’t know it quite yet, but something terrible is about to happen to him.
Now he knows.
The dreaded right field to first base putout. The 9-3. A hitter’s nightmare. A scorer’s dream. It probably happened to you in Little League. It definitely happened to me in Little League. It’s so bad that you pray it never happens again. Especially if you make it to the majors and it’s broadcast on national television. What could be more embarrassing than hitting a ball cleanly to the outfield, in what would be a hit 99% of the time, only to have your lack of speed exposed for all to see by getting gunned at first base?
Except Omar Infante isn’t slow, which makes this perhaps even more embarrassing. Infante has hit thousands of foul balls in his career and even more that stayed fair. He should have a pretty good grasp of what’s going to be fair or foul off the bat. But here, for some reason, Infante assumed incorrectly immediately upon making contact that the ball he hit was going foul, despite the fact that it really wasn’t even close to being foul. Jose Bautista knew better, made a great sliding stop and came up firing to first without hesitation. Unlike Omar Infante, Bautista knew exactly what he was doing. It’s almost like he has experience making 9-3 putouts…
his happened the night before to Infante’s teammate Billy Butler. And Butler was trying. This is the less unusual way for one of the more unusual events in baseball to occur. This is Billy Butler, a very slow man, hitting a hard line drive to a right fielder with a very good arm. The strong-armed man understood the limitations of the slow-footed man and exploited and embarrassed him in the process.
To the naked eye, this appears to be the more traditional way for a 9-3 putout to occur. But that doesn’t stop it from being absolutely remarkable for a couple of reasons.
First, just look how deep Bautista is playing. He had to come in, like, six steps before he even fielded the ball. Next, remember that the same player – Jose Bautista – recorded a 9-3 putout in consecutive nights. To put that into context, there have only been 29 instances of a 9-3 putout occurring since 1990, according to research done by Baseball Prospectus. Since 2000, it has only happened 19 times, according to research done by me. This is something that happens, on average, about once per year. The same guy did it on back-to-back nights to the same team. What makes it even more remarkable is that they were both done to position players.
Consider this table of 9-3 putouts that have occurred since the year 2000:
Year Fielder Runner Position
2014 Jose Bautista Omar Infante 2B
2014 Jose Bautista Billy Butler DH
2014 Gerardo Parra Dan Haren P
2012 Carlos Beltran Josh Beckett P
2011 Jayson Werth Edward Mujica P
2011 Jeff Francoeur Michael Taylor OF
2010 Ryan Sweeney Mike Redmond C
2010 Roger Bernadina Roy Oswalt P
2010 Hunter Pence Mike Minor P
2010 Angel Pagan Kyle Kendrick P
2007 Luke Scott Derek Lowe P
2003 Rene Reyes Jimmy Haynes P
2002 Gabe Kapler John Patterson P
2002 B.J. Surhoff Jeff D’Amico P
2000 Brian Jordan Garrett Stephenson P
2000 Mark Kotsay Elmer Dessens P
2000 Brian Jordan Francisco Cordova P
2000 Brian Jordan Clayton Andrews P
2000 Lance Berkman Luis Ordaz SS
Notice anything about this table?
Well, first, if FanGraphs and MLB.TV and Photoshop CS6 were around 14 years ago, this post would totally be about Brian Jordan because what the hell was going on with him in the year 2000.
But notice anything else about this table?
Position players don’t really get thrown out from right field. It’s almost exclusively pitchers. This makes sense. Pitchers just need to be able to throw a ball. They don’t need to be able to run the bases, jump, dive or cover ground in the field. The percentage of pitchers who are speedy, athletic specimens is much lower than the percentage of position players who are speedy, athletic specimens. The even bigger reason, though, is that pitchers just can’t hit, so outfielders play closer to the infield, making 9-3 putouts all the more likely.
In 2011, Michael Taylor, an outfielder, got thrown out at first by Jeff Francoeur, who is known for his strong arm. In 2010, Mike Redmond, a really slow catcher, was thrown out at first by Ryan Sweeney. After that, you have to go back a full decade to Luis Ordaz, a shortstop, being gunned by Lance Berkman in 2000 to find another position player being thrown out at first base from right field. Again: Jose Bautista did this twice in consecutive days.
And even Redmond’s was more the result of defensive positioning than it was just getting gunned:
ot only were the bases loaded, but in Mike Redmond’s 13-year career, he hit exactly 13 home runs, so the outfield probably wasn’t too worried about a ball going over their heads. The defensive alignment Redmond saw from the outfield is not too different from the one most pitchers see, so this example barely even counts as a position player being thrown out.
As for the Michael Taylor one, I’m still not totally sure how this happened:
I guess you can just chalk it up to Jeff Francoeur having a really great arm and Michael Taylor hitting the ball too hard. Francoeur doesn’t seem to be playing too shallow, which makes sense because Michael Taylor is pretty fast and has some pop in his bat. Taylor maybe gets out of the box a little slow, but this is just a great play by Jeff Francoeur. (Yes you did just read that sentence on FanGraphs).
So, before Thursday night, you could go back 14 years and find exactly three examples of a position player being thrown out at first base from right field. It happened to Mike Redmond because the bases were loaded, he’s really slow and can’t hit, so he was being played like a pitcher. It happened to Michael Taylor because he took a second to get out of the box and Jeff Francoeur has a really strong arm. And it happened to Luis Ordaz, though I can’t say exactly how because there’s no video footage of it.
On Thursday night, Bautista just straight up gunned Billy Butler and the following night, capitalized on a mental error by Omar Infante to record two 9-3 putouts on non-pitchers in two games. Jose Bautista himself did in two nights what only three players have done in the last 14 years.
As if the Royals offense wasn’t sad enough already, now they can’t even hit a ball cleanly to the outfield without Jose Bautista making them feel like little leaguers again.
Wow. That’s a pretty boring GIF, huh? J.A. Happ threw that pitch and Omar Infante fouled it off. Nothing to see here.
Unless, that is, you already know what happened in this at bat. The Omar Infante in this GIF doesn’t know it quite yet, but something terrible is about to happen to him.
Now he knows.
The dreaded right field to first base putout. The 9-3. A hitter’s nightmare. A scorer’s dream. It probably happened to you in Little League. It definitely happened to me in Little League. It’s so bad that you pray it never happens again. Especially if you make it to the majors and it’s broadcast on national television. What could be more embarrassing than hitting a ball cleanly to the outfield, in what would be a hit 99% of the time, only to have your lack of speed exposed for all to see by getting gunned at first base?
Except Omar Infante isn’t slow, which makes this perhaps even more embarrassing. Infante has hit thousands of foul balls in his career and even more that stayed fair. He should have a pretty good grasp of what’s going to be fair or foul off the bat. But here, for some reason, Infante assumed incorrectly immediately upon making contact that the ball he hit was going foul, despite the fact that it really wasn’t even close to being foul. Jose Bautista knew better, made a great sliding stop and came up firing to first without hesitation. Unlike Omar Infante, Bautista knew exactly what he was doing. It’s almost like he has experience making 9-3 putouts…
his happened the night before to Infante’s teammate Billy Butler. And Butler was trying. This is the less unusual way for one of the more unusual events in baseball to occur. This is Billy Butler, a very slow man, hitting a hard line drive to a right fielder with a very good arm. The strong-armed man understood the limitations of the slow-footed man and exploited and embarrassed him in the process.
To the naked eye, this appears to be the more traditional way for a 9-3 putout to occur. But that doesn’t stop it from being absolutely remarkable for a couple of reasons.
First, just look how deep Bautista is playing. He had to come in, like, six steps before he even fielded the ball. Next, remember that the same player – Jose Bautista – recorded a 9-3 putout in consecutive nights. To put that into context, there have only been 29 instances of a 9-3 putout occurring since 1990, according to research done by Baseball Prospectus. Since 2000, it has only happened 19 times, according to research done by me. This is something that happens, on average, about once per year. The same guy did it on back-to-back nights to the same team. What makes it even more remarkable is that they were both done to position players.
Consider this table of 9-3 putouts that have occurred since the year 2000:
Year Fielder Runner Position
2014 Jose Bautista Omar Infante 2B
2014 Jose Bautista Billy Butler DH
2014 Gerardo Parra Dan Haren P
2012 Carlos Beltran Josh Beckett P
2011 Jayson Werth Edward Mujica P
2011 Jeff Francoeur Michael Taylor OF
2010 Ryan Sweeney Mike Redmond C
2010 Roger Bernadina Roy Oswalt P
2010 Hunter Pence Mike Minor P
2010 Angel Pagan Kyle Kendrick P
2007 Luke Scott Derek Lowe P
2003 Rene Reyes Jimmy Haynes P
2002 Gabe Kapler John Patterson P
2002 B.J. Surhoff Jeff D’Amico P
2000 Brian Jordan Garrett Stephenson P
2000 Mark Kotsay Elmer Dessens P
2000 Brian Jordan Francisco Cordova P
2000 Brian Jordan Clayton Andrews P
2000 Lance Berkman Luis Ordaz SS
Notice anything about this table?
Well, first, if FanGraphs and MLB.TV and Photoshop CS6 were around 14 years ago, this post would totally be about Brian Jordan because what the hell was going on with him in the year 2000.
But notice anything else about this table?
Position players don’t really get thrown out from right field. It’s almost exclusively pitchers. This makes sense. Pitchers just need to be able to throw a ball. They don’t need to be able to run the bases, jump, dive or cover ground in the field. The percentage of pitchers who are speedy, athletic specimens is much lower than the percentage of position players who are speedy, athletic specimens. The even bigger reason, though, is that pitchers just can’t hit, so outfielders play closer to the infield, making 9-3 putouts all the more likely.
In 2011, Michael Taylor, an outfielder, got thrown out at first by Jeff Francoeur, who is known for his strong arm. In 2010, Mike Redmond, a really slow catcher, was thrown out at first by Ryan Sweeney. After that, you have to go back a full decade to Luis Ordaz, a shortstop, being gunned by Lance Berkman in 2000 to find another position player being thrown out at first base from right field. Again: Jose Bautista did this twice in consecutive days.
And even Redmond’s was more the result of defensive positioning than it was just getting gunned:
ot only were the bases loaded, but in Mike Redmond’s 13-year career, he hit exactly 13 home runs, so the outfield probably wasn’t too worried about a ball going over their heads. The defensive alignment Redmond saw from the outfield is not too different from the one most pitchers see, so this example barely even counts as a position player being thrown out.
As for the Michael Taylor one, I’m still not totally sure how this happened:
I guess you can just chalk it up to Jeff Francoeur having a really great arm and Michael Taylor hitting the ball too hard. Francoeur doesn’t seem to be playing too shallow, which makes sense because Michael Taylor is pretty fast and has some pop in his bat. Taylor maybe gets out of the box a little slow, but this is just a great play by Jeff Francoeur. (Yes you did just read that sentence on FanGraphs).
So, before Thursday night, you could go back 14 years and find exactly three examples of a position player being thrown out at first base from right field. It happened to Mike Redmond because the bases were loaded, he’s really slow and can’t hit, so he was being played like a pitcher. It happened to Michael Taylor because he took a second to get out of the box and Jeff Francoeur has a really strong arm. And it happened to Luis Ordaz, though I can’t say exactly how because there’s no video footage of it.
On Thursday night, Bautista just straight up gunned Billy Butler and the following night, capitalized on a mental error by Omar Infante to record two 9-3 putouts on non-pitchers in two games. Jose Bautista himself did in two nights what only three players have done in the last 14 years.
As if the Royals offense wasn’t sad enough already, now they can’t even hit a ball cleanly to the outfield without Jose Bautista making them feel like little leaguers again.
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
- 1,844
Hopefully the A's translate all of this regular season winning into postseason success. Would like to see them win a ring.
Would LOVE to see them get a new stadium, but that's another story. Freshest team in the league shouldn't have to play in such a dump.
Would LOVE to see them get a new stadium, but that's another story. Freshest team in the league shouldn't have to play in such a dump.
- Feb 19, 2006
- 13,656
- 1,083
Entertain me bro,
I know you're dying to throw those two chips, so let's keep it individual...
Old school metrics, new school metrics... Kershaw > Lincecum
- Feb 12, 2005
- 58,804
- 30,199
Me.
I don't want Mauer's stale *** in a keeper league.
Not for Kris Bryant at least...
You knoooowwwww you want him. Just how bad?
Last edited:
- May 2, 2012
- 27,111
- 14,584
What pitchers are giving up hard-hit balls least often in 2014?
Lots of surprises on this top 60 list
Lots of surprises on this top 60 list
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
- 1,844
Individually in the playoffs, Kershaw and Lincecum have the same amount of starts. One guy has a 4.23 ERA and a 1.278 WHIP, the other has a 2.47 ERA and a .878 WHIP. One has two rings, the other has zero.Entertain me bro,
I know you're dying to throw those two chips, so let's keep it individual...
Old school metrics, new school metrics... Kershaw > Lincecum
- Feb 17, 2007
- 21,784
- 2,957
Nah man, it's like Barry Zito. Got the $tat$ where it matters 
- Feb 19, 2006
- 13,656
- 1,083
Cool, the Robert Horry argument.
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
- 1,844
Except Lincecum has been dominant in the regular season as well...
Me.
I don't want Mauer's stale *** in a keeper league.
Not for Kris Bryant at least...
You knoooowwwww you want him. Just how bad?
I'm listening.......
- Feb 19, 2006
- 13,656
- 1,083
That's not the discussion.
No doubt he dominated those two Cy Young seasons, and stellar the following two... that about it...
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
- 1,844
They've both won 2 Cy Young Awards. Lincecum has lead the league in strikeouts one more time than Kershaw. They've both finished first in WAR for pitchers twice. Kershaw has the ERA advantage and career WAR advantage, but it's not far fetched to say Lincecum has had the better career because it's a plausible argument.
I personally think Kershaw has had the better career, but it is up for debate to this point IMO. And I never throw out rings, that doesn't make much sense to me.
- Apr 27, 2009
- 19,563
- 6,839
rings in baseball is a terrible argument
- Aug 2, 2006
- 34,144
- 29,488
Its the peak performance vs longevity argument.
Timmy in his prime was ridiculously dominant better than Kershaws best so far, but Clayton is going to have a longer career.
Timmy in his prime was ridiculously dominant better than Kershaws best so far, but Clayton is going to have a longer career.
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
- 1,844
What makes rings in baseball different than any other sport?
- Apr 27, 2009
- 19,563
- 6,839
I think the argument can only be used for basketball and quarterbacks
Baseball requires a legit team to win the WS, a players dominance shouldn't be thought of less because they play on a terrible team e.g. Felix Hernandez
- Feb 19, 2006
- 13,656
- 1,083
Using what metrics?
Pick two from Kershaws 2011, 2012, 2013 and put it up against Lincecum's 2008 and 2009.
Last edited:
- Feb 17, 2007
- 21,784
- 2,957
I somewhat see what you're saying about basketball, but QBs? The position was recently overpowered, it's hard to give QBs the majority of the credit any earlier than the mid 00s.
- Oct 14, 2005
- 12,443
- 1,194
I'm like Folks The NBA and If you're QB only matter.
- Apr 27, 2009
- 19,563
- 6,839
If you look at the previous SB winners except for a select few teams the winners have pretty good QB's. They may not have been putting up the crazy numbers before but they were still doing all the audibles and reads.
- Feb 17, 2007
- 21,784
- 2,957
Yeah I can understand. Individually, QBs matter more than any other position. But I would take a great DL with solid secondary before a great QB every time. I think it's hard for one man to carry a team all the way in football.
- Dec 5, 2008
- 6,463
- 1,844
I see. I understand the King Felix side of it, but I still think rings are important when the player has been to the playoffs numerous times and hasn't performed well/or has performed well.
- Feb 12, 2005
- 58,804
- 30,199
Cano 3-0 versus the Yankers.
- Status
