When discussing the positive surprises of the first month of the 2014 baseball season, the words “Milwaukee Brewers” and “Charlie Blackmon” are sure to come up very early in the conversation. While Blackmon has clearly not been the most valuable player on his own club – Troy Tulowitzki says hi – he does deserve every bit of attention and scrutiny that has come his way. Who is Charlie Blackmon? Where did he come from, figuratively? What is he, and where might he be going? Let’s look at the track record and attempt to make some educated guesses.
When the Rockies selected Blackmon in the second round of the 2008 draft with the 72nd overall selection, it was considered an overdraft by most. He was recruited by Georgia Tech as a two-way player out of Young Harris Junior College, but wound up pitching only two innings at Tech, finding a home as their leadoff man and a regular outfielder, though not their everyday centerfielder. He was about to turn 22 when he was drafted, and despite a very strong junior season, had yet to establish the type of proven track record with the bat – wood or aluminum – that teams search for high in the draft. Despite this fact, the Rockies, to their credit, were undaunted, and pulled the trigger on Blackmon.
At his relatively advanced age for a college junior, the Rockies were hoping for early minor league success, and quick advancement. While his .307-.370-.433 line, with 30 steals, in his first full pro season at High-A Modesto was respectable, it took place in a hitters’ league, and didn’t exactly scream “prospect”. Neither did his .297-.360-.484 season at AA in 2010, when he celebrated his 24th birthday on July 1.
His closest thing to a “breakthrough” occurred in the summer of 2011, when he tore up the hitter-friendly AAA Pacific Coast League at a .337-.393-.572 clip over 58 games and earned his first major league opportunity. Not only was the league hitter-friendly, but so was his Colorado Springs home park. If PCL stats in general are to be taken with a grain of salt, Colorado Springs numbers should be taken with a full tablespoon.
Each season, I utilize a system that evaluates minor league prospects both by their performance and age relative to their minor league level. Performers with respect to either criteria qualify for the list, which usually numbers around 300 position players, and extreme performers with respect to both reside at or near the top. Virtually every major league regular qualified for this list at some point during their minor league career, with the occasional exception of an all-glove, no-hit catcher or shortstop. The list is basically a master follow list for professional scouting coverage – and Charlie Blackmon never made the list. He barely missed in 2011 – by a day age-wise, and fractionally, performance-wise, but miss it he did. He never made a Baseball America Top 100 list, either, an admittedly more stringent criteria.
Blackmon continued to fly well beneath the radar in his first two major league trials in 2011 and 2012, before doing just a bit better last season. Though his .309-.336-.467 2013 line appears quite solid on the surface, there are two major cautionary factors that must be taken into consideration. First, there’s his awful 49/7 K/BB ratio. While his K rate was acceptable, his BB rate was off-the-charts bad. It should not have been a surprise, as he had never walked more than 39 times in a minor league season. His K rates had always been better than league average in the minors, but were never so good that warning bells would signal this as an area of future strength at the major league level.
The other significant factor is the Coors Field effect. I discussed this in detail in my preseason article on the Rockies – yes, I thought the Rockies had the potential to contend, and no, I didn’t see the Blackmon thing coming – Coors makes average hitters into stars, and can fool you into thinking well below average ones deserve their everyday jobs. Based on my own calculations utilizing granular batted-ball data, the overall, fly ball and line drive park factors for Coors Field (by field sector) in 2013 were:
OVERALL: LF= 116.9 LCF= 117.1 CF= 125.7 RCF= 161.5 RF= 118.5 ALL= 127.8
FLY: 118.6 166.3 149.9 287.9 150.4 176.4
LINE DRIVE: 110.8 109.9 106.2 124.7 98.2 109.6
Now there’s some help for lefties. All of Blackmon’s accomplishments must be placed in this context.
So what happened to turn Blackmon from the reasonable contributor he appeared to be last season to 2nd-in-the-NL-in-wOBA-guy in 2014, with a .359-.398-.590 line entering Monday’s games? Look no further than his K rate, which for no apparent reason has plunged from 19.0% in 2013 to 7.7% in 2014, the second best in the NL. This has been keyed by a startling plunge in his swing-and-miss rate from 8.7% last season to 4.4% thus far in 2014. Yup – he has cut his swing-and-miss rate in half, and his K rate by almost 150%, in a very short period of time. These things do not happen every day.
To become more familiar with relative variability of swing-and-miss rates of high-contact players, I identified players who had seasonal swing-and-miss rates of 5.0% or better in three or more batting average title-qualifying seasons over the past decade. They appear below:
# QUAL
Video: Reit-er Wrong: Mariano Rivera Takes Pedroia Over Cano
Rivera is certainly familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of both players, but on-field greatness doesn't always equate to a tremendous ability to build a roster; just ask anyone who has ever cheered for a basketball team built by Michael Jordan. So, with all due respect for Rivera's experience, let's see what the numbers have to say about Cano and Pedroia.
One of my favorite features of the FanGraphs leaderboards is that you can filter by calendar years, so we can look at what Cano and Pedroia have done over the past three full seasons, including their start to the 2014 season. Because we don't want to overweight recent performance, going back three years should give us a good sense of each player's present abilities. Let's just start with their primary offensive numbers over the last 1,095 days.
Name AVG OBP SLG
Robinson Cano 0.309 0.371 0.521
Dustin Pedroia 0.302 0.369 0.449
In terms of batting average and on-base percentage, it's essentially a dead heat, though Cano has hit for significantly more power. While Pedroia is an excellent hitter in his own right, Cano has simply been better, perfecting the same high-contact approach that Pedroia has mastered while also adding in even more extra base hits.
And while rate stats like these can be misleading when comparing an injury-prone player to a workhorse who takes the field every day that is not the case here. Over those last three calendar years, Cano has played in 482 games and hit 2,071 times, while Pedroia has played in 461 games and hit 2,085 times. In terms of playing time, they're near equals, so one cannot argue that Pedroia would be more likely to be healthy for Rivera's "one game" scenario.
Of course, there's more to baseball than just hitting. What about base running? After all, Pedroia thumps Cano in base stealing 62 to 18 over those last three years, so perhaps he makes up for the difference at the plate by scoring more often when he does get on base? Well, no, that's not true either. To get those extra 44 stolen bases, Pedroia has had to sacrifice 14 outs due to getting thrown out on stolen base attempts, nullifying most of the additional value added from those successful stolen bases. And when it comes to the kinds of baserunning that aren't measured by stolen base attempts, Cano has actually been slightly better according to our calculations, so there's no real advantage on the basepaths for either player.
However, there is one area where Pedroia does have a decided edge, and that's in the field. Despite Cano being a two time Gold Glove winner, advanced defensive metrics greatly prefer Pedroia, with Ultimate Zone Rating judging Pedroia to have made enough plays in the field to equal 30 extra runs saved relative to Cano's fielding over the last three years. That's a big gap, but there is more uncertainty surrounding estimates of fielding value than there is of batting value, so it is possible that metrics like UZR are overstating the difference to some degree. Still, Pedroia likely makes up a good chunk of the offensive difference in the field.
But he doesn't make up the entire difference. While Pedroia's defensive edge is estimated at 30 runs, the value of Cano's additional power has created an extra 41 offensive runs over the last three seasons, so even if you give Pedroia full credit for the defensive gap, Cano still comes out as a slightly better player. To be sure, 11 runs over three seasons is hardly any difference at all, and both are excellent players, but the numbers do not suggest any real advantage for Pedroia. One could argue that they've performed similarly in recent years, but there isn't much of a case to be made that Pedroia has clearly performed better.
And there's an extra wrinkle to this argument, because Rivera made the case for Pedroia on the basis of trying to win a single game, which forces us to consider the environment in which that game may be played. While Yankee Stadium is certainly a nice place for left-handed hitters, Cano has shown no real variation in performance based on ballpark, posting an .856 OPS at home and an .858 OPS on the road. Regardless of where that one game was played, you could essentially expect Robinson Cano to hit like Robison Cano.
Pedroia, on the other hand, has taken full advantage of the Green Monster in Fenway Park, posting a .876 OPS at home and a .764 OPS on the road throughout his career. At home, Pedroia has averaged one double every 12.7 trips to the plate; on the road, that falls to one every 20.7 plate appearances. As a right-handed pull power guy, Pedroia's skillset is a perfect match for Boston's home park, and he simply isn't the same offensive force when the team is made to travel.
So, if you're trying to win one game in Fenway Park, you really could build an argument for Pedroia; his swing is tailor-made for the giant wall in Boston. In any of the other 29 Major League ballparks, though, you're probably better off with Cano. Rivera might not see the same kind of "passion" in his attitude, but personality really only matters to the extent that it improves your results on the field. Maybe Rivera is right and Cano could be better if he tried a little more, but even at his current effort level, Cano has been as good or better than Pedroia.
He might not yell and scream, but he takes the field every day and hits the crap out of the baseball. There's no shame in loving Dustin Pedroia and everything he brings to the table, but let's not diminish Robinson Cano in the process; the numbers suggest he, and not Pedroia, is the guy you'd probably want at second base if you were trying to win just one game - as long as that game wasn't held in Boston, anyways.
He might not yell and scream, but he takes the field every day and hits the crap out of the baseball. There's no shame in loving Dustin Pedroia and everything he brings to the table, but let's not diminish Robinson Cano in the process; the numbers suggest he, and not Pedroia, is the guy you'd probably want at second base if you were trying to win just one game - as long as that game wasn't held in Boston, anyways.